Department
Biblical and Theological Studies
Location
Bethel University
Start Date
25-10-2023 3:00 PM
End Date
25-10-2023 5:00 PM
Description
The problem of divine hiddenness is an objection to Christianity that claims that a perfectly loving God would make his existence more obvious than it, in fact, is. The philosopher, J. L. Schellenberg has argued extensively there are some people who fall into the category of "non-resistant nonbelievers," people who desire to believe in and be in relationship with God, but who cannot due to the lack of evidence for God's existence. Schellenberg argues that the existence of non-resistant nonbelievers is incompatible with God's being perfectly loving and all-powerful. In response, I argue that even if there are nonresistant nonbelievers, Schellenberg's argument fails because he fails to acknowledge two important realities: (1) God's provision of evidence of his existence does not mean that all humans will see that evidence and (2) it is possible that some people are nonresistant to the idea of God's existence, but still unwilling to accept the personal implications of God's existence.
Recommended Citation
Beilby, Jim, "Is "Divine Hiddenness" evidence for atheism? A response to J. L. Schellenberg" (2023). Day of Scholarship. 34.
https://spark.bethel.edu/dayofscholarship/fall2023/oct25/34
Is "Divine Hiddenness" evidence for atheism? A response to J. L. Schellenberg
Bethel University
The problem of divine hiddenness is an objection to Christianity that claims that a perfectly loving God would make his existence more obvious than it, in fact, is. The philosopher, J. L. Schellenberg has argued extensively there are some people who fall into the category of "non-resistant nonbelievers," people who desire to believe in and be in relationship with God, but who cannot due to the lack of evidence for God's existence. Schellenberg argues that the existence of non-resistant nonbelievers is incompatible with God's being perfectly loving and all-powerful. In response, I argue that even if there are nonresistant nonbelievers, Schellenberg's argument fails because he fails to acknowledge two important realities: (1) God's provision of evidence of his existence does not mean that all humans will see that evidence and (2) it is possible that some people are nonresistant to the idea of God's existence, but still unwilling to accept the personal implications of God's existence.